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Abstract 
Is China’s demand for resources driven predominantly by domestic factors or by 
global demand for its exports? The answer to this question is important for many 
resource-exporting countries, such as Australia, Brazil,  Canada  and  India.  This 
paper provides evidence that China’s (mainly manufacturing) exports have been a 
significant driver  of its demand for resource commodities over recent decades. 
First,  it employs  input-output tables to demonstrate that,  historically, 
manufacturing has been at least as important as construction as a driver of China’s 
demand for resource-intensive metal products. Second, it shows that global trade in 
non-oil resource commodities can be described by the gravity model of trade. 
Using this model it is found that, controlling for domestic expenditure (including 
investment), exports  are a sizeable and significant determinant of a country’s 
resource  imports, and that this  has been true for China  as well as for other 
countries. 
JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F14, F40, Q31, Q33  
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SOURCES OF CHINESE DEMAND FOR RESOURCE 
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1.  Introduction 
China’s demand for resources is large. China accounts for around two-thirds of 
world iron ore demand, around one-third of aluminium ore demand and more than 
45 per cent  of  global demand for coal.1
Understanding the sources of Chinese demand for resources is important. On the 
one hand, if the demand for resources is driven by infrastructure and housing 
investment, then China’s resource imports depend on the rate of urbanisation and 
the government’s continued focus on improving public facilities.
  Accordingly, Chinese demand for 
resources is of considerable importance to resource-exporting countries such as 
Australia, Brazil, Canada and India. Just as there is debate over the sources of 
Chinese growth – investment versus exports – there is a similar question as to the 
relative importance of investment and exports as drivers of resource demand. 
2
This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue in two main ways. First, we 
use input-output tables to trace through the direct and indirect effects that the 
construction and manufacturing sectors have on resource demand. We demonstrate 
that, over the past decade or so, manufacturing has been at least as important as 
construction as a driver of China’s consumption of resources. Second, we show 
that global trade in non-oil resource commodities can be described by the gravity 
model of trade. Using this model we find that, controlling for domestic expenditure 
 On the other 
hand, if China’s manufacturing export industry is an important driver of resource 
demand, then China’s demand for resource commodities may be more vulnerable 
to external developments. 
                                           
1  The sources for these shares are the US Geological Survey (USGS 2010b) and the 
United  Nations  COMTRADE  database; USGS (2010a) and CEIC; and BP  (2010), 
respectively. According to the US Energy Information Department, China is also the second-
largest consumer of oil after the US, but we do not consider China’s demand for oil in this 
paper. 
2  The view that construction investment drives steel production and hence China’s demand for 
iron ore appears to be common among commodity analysts. See, for example, 
Komesaroff (2008). 2 
 
 
(including investment), total exports are,  in general,  a sizeable and significant 
determinant of a country’s resource imports, and that this has also been true for 
China. 
The approach taken by this paper differs from previous work on the drivers of 
China’s demand for resources. A few papers consider the question for individual 
commodities using time-series econometric techniques: for example, demand for 
energy commodities such as oil and coal (Crompton and Wu  2005;  Zhao and 
Wu 2007), or iron ore (Tcha and Wright 1999). By and large, these papers 
emphasise industrial production or GDP growth as the main determinant of 
resource demand; they do not focus on the extent to which exports or investment 
are important.  Focusing on steel  demand in particular, McKay, Sheng and 
Song (2010) report that a country’s urbanisation rate, investment and automobile 
use are statistically significant determinants of its GDP per capita – which in turn 
displays a positive quadratic relationship with steel use (the ‘Kuznets curve 
for steel’)  –  while  trade openness is insignificant. In contrast, Kahrl and 
Roland-Holst (2008) use input-output tables to demonstrate a clear link between 
China’s export production and its demand for oil and coal. Garnaut and 
Song (2006, 2007) argue that three variables – the investment share of output, the 
export share of production,  and the level of urbanisation –  determine China’s 
demand for metals and energy. This view is supported by Zhang and Zheng (2008) 
who argue that manufacturing production has a significant influence on resource 
demand.  We do not dispute this general assessment, but instead use a gravity 
model of trade to demonstrate that China’s (predominantly manufacturing) exports 
have been a significant determinant of its non-oil resource imports. 
With the exception of Eita and Jordaan (2007), we are unaware of any previous 
efforts to model trade in resource commodities using this approach.3
                                           
3  Eita and Jordaan analyse South African metal exports to 33 trading partners using a gravity 
model. 
 However, 
many recent studies have used the gravity framework to model China’s role in 
international merchandise trade. Edmonds, La Croix and Li (2008) and Bussière 
and Schnatz (2009) find that China’s aggregate bilateral trade can be explained by 
the gravity model. Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong (2007), Greenaway, Mahabir and 
Milner (2008) and Athukorala (2009) use the gravity model to examine whether 
China’s growth has had an effect on Asian countries’ exports to third countries. 3 
 
 
Eichengreen et al (2007) find that China’s exports tend to displace the exports of 
less-developed Asian economies (but not those of high-income Asian economies). 
In contrast, Greenaway  et  al  (2008)  find that China’s exports ‘crowd out’  the 
exports of most Asian economies (particularly the more developed economies), 
while Athukorala (2009) finds little evidence of crowding out. 
Work that is more closely related to our paper is Sheng and Song (2008), who 
model bilateral trade between Australia and China at the industry level using a 
gravity model. They find that China’s trade with Australia is negatively correlated 
with tariff rates and positively correlated with measures of each country’s 
‘revealed comparative advantage’. They also report that China’s revealed 
comparative advantage in downstream industries (such as manufacturing) tends to 
be positively correlated with China-Australia trade in upstream industries (such as 
resources). This supports the idea that,  in recent decades, China’s imports of 
resources have been heavily influenced by its manufacturing export sector. 
This  paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the debate on the key 
contributors to GDP growth in China, and presents some facts about Chinese 
investment and exports. Section 3 highlights construction and manufacturing as the 
primary end-use sectors for resources and metal products, and uses input-output 
tables to analyse these linkages. Section 4 uses a gravity model of resource trade to 
test the idea that manufacturing exports have influenced  China’s imports of 
resources. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Sources of Chinese Growth 
2.1  The Debate about the Sources of Growth 
The question of what drives China’s demand for resources is related to the more 
general debate about the sources of China’s growth. The idea that global demand 
for low-cost Chinese manufacturing exports has been a major contributor to 
China’s strong growth performance in the post-1978  reform era is taken for 
granted  in  many  papers (for example,  Eichengreen  et al  2007; Haltmaier 
et al 2009; Blonigen and Ma 2010). Reports suggesting that China’s growth has 
been ‘export-led’ have also regularly appeared in the media (for example, 
Stutchbury 2009). 4 
 
 
But the view that China’s growth has been driven by exports has recently been 
widely criticised. Keidel (2008) uses  case studies of China’s macroeconomic 
booms and slowdowns since 1978 to argue that domestic shifts in investment and 
consumption have been primarily responsible for China’s growth. In a similar vein, 
Anderson (2007), He and Zhang (2010) and Sun (2009)  all  argue that exports 
divided by GDP (currently at about 30 per cent) overstates the export share of the 
economy. Anderson views this measure as especially flawed in China’s case, as 
Chinese exports have a low value-added content due to the prevalence of high 
value-added imported intermediate inputs. He and Zhang use input-output tables 
(for 2002) developed by Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008)  to show that,  once 
processing trade is accounted for, China’s ratio of export value-added to GDP is 
only about 15 per cent. 
He and Zhang (2010)  also  employ a provincial-level panel dataset to test for 
leading relationships between export growth and growth in domestic expenditure. 
They find that export growth Granger causes investment growth and GDP growth 
in the coastal provinces (which have been the focus of the Chinese government’s 
efforts to increase China’s export orientation for many years), but that it does not 
Granger cause investment growth in China overall. Based on more disaggregated 
tests,  they  argue that the main channel through which export growth Granger 
causes GDP growth is its positive impact on productivity growth. 
Recent research thus argues that exports have been a less significant contributor to 
GDP growth than investment and consumption in the reform era. But this does not 
mean that exports – and the manufacturing sector more generally – are unimportant 
for growth or the demand for resources. Attempts to calculate the contribution of 
exports to growth tell us little about how important the export sector really is in the 
Chinese economy because they  do not account for  the indirect effects of the 
manufacturing export sector on investment. The growth  of the export sector, 
together with domestically oriented manufacturing operations, has undoubtedly 
fuelled substantial investment spending. This investment includes capital spending 
related directly to manufacturing, but also investment in infrastructure, services 




2.2  Some Facts about Chinese Investment and Exports 
One  commonly used way to determine the sources of Chinese growth is  to 
calculate the contributions of investment, consumption and net exports to GDP 
growth. However, comparing the contribution of net exports to growth with the 
contributions of other components tells us little about the fundamental drivers of 
growth in any given economy.4
Nonetheless,  such  statistics  provide useful background  information, and build 
intuition for what the sources of resource demand in China might be. On an 
expenditure basis, the key contributor to Chinese growth in recent years has been 
investment.  Since 2000,  real  GDP  growth has averaged  around  10 per cent 
per year. Gross fixed capital formation has accounted for more than half of this 
growth, with an average real growth rate of 12 per cent per year, and a share in 
GDP of over 40 per cent in 2009.  Consumption has accounted for around 
two-fifths of GDP growth, with annual growth of roughly 8 per cent. Net exports 
have accounted for only one-twentieth of annual growth in GDP over this period. 
But as we have observed, calculating the contribution of net exports ignores the 
fact that exports may be an important driver of growth in national income. In fact, 
exports have contributed more than a third of annual real GDP growth since 2000. 
Owing to the apparent importance of investment and exports for growth, we 
proceed by examining the sectoral drivers of investment, before considering some 
facts about the Chinese export sector. 
 A country could have net exports of zero and yet 
exports could produce much of the income that supports consumption (including of 
imported consumer items) and drive growth in investment (which might also 
absorb a sizeable share of imports). And even if exports are small relative to total 
GDP, this may hide many indirect effects that an expanding export sector has on 
growth (and the demand for resources). These effects cannot be easily seen from 
the national accounts, but can be detected,  at least partially,  with input-output 
tables (as in Section 3) or with the aid of an econometric model (as in Section 4). 
Much of the increase in Chinese investment in the past decade, and particularly in 
the past year or so, has been driven by strong growth in residential and non-
                                           
4  As noted by He and Zhang (2010), the calculation of a GDP component’s contribution to 
growth is ‘purely an accounting relationship, suggesting no theoretical relationships or 
theoretical underpinning’. 6 
 
 
residential construction. It is commonplace to think of this construction as being 
driven primarily by ‘infrastructure’ investment.  To the extent that  this  is  true, 
however, it says little about what might be driving that building in the first place. 
In particular, substantial  investment in infrastructure is necessary to support 
commercial activities such as manufacturing and retail trade, and demand that 
arises from those sectors. 
Manufacturing and infrastructure are now of roughly equal size as a share of total 
investment, at around 30 per cent (Figure 1).5
Figure 1: Fixed Asset Investment by Industry 
 The next largest category is real 
estate investment, with the primary, mining and service sectors accounting for the 
remainder. After rising in the mid 1990s, the share of infrastructure investment has 
declined while manufacturing has rapidly gained share in the current decade, 
overtaking infrastructure around 2007. This situation reversed in early 2009 (at 
least temporarily) as growth in infrastructure investment picked up sharply due to 
the fiscal stimulus measures introduced by the government. 
Per cent of total urban fixed asset investment, current prices 
 
Sources: CEIC; RBA 
                                           
5  Since disaggregated data on gross fixed capital formation are not publicly available, we must 
use fixed asset investment (FAI) data. See Appendix A for details on how the sectoral FAI 
series are constructed from available sources. 7 
 
 
The increased importance of manufacturing and real estate in total investment is 
related to another trend: the growing role of the private sector in investment 
(Figure 2). Although recent fiscal stimulus measures have at least temporarily 
boosted the role of the state in driving investment spending, for many years 
investment by government-owned or -controlled (‘public’) enterprises has been 
steadily declining as a share of urban investment. Over the past five years, the 
share of public investment has fallen from almost 60 per cent to around 
45 per cent. The falling share of public investment and the rising share of private 
investment reflect both the legal transformation of state-owned firms into joint-
stock corporations  and  a change in the industrial composition of investment: 
infrastructure investment continues to be mainly  conducted by firms under 
government ownership or control, while the rapid growth in manufacturing and 
real estate investment has been driven mainly by the private sector. 
Figure 2: Fixed Asset Investment by Industry and by Ownership 
Per cent of total urban fixed asset investment 
 
Notes:  ‘State’ denotes investment undertaken by enterprises in which the state is the largest shareholder. 
‘Private’ denotes investment undertaken by enterprises in which private entities have the primary holding. 
Source:  National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Growth in (predominantly private) manufacturing investment has partly reflected 
the rise of the Chinese manufacturing export sector. China’s manufactured exports 
have risen significantly since the early 1990s, in line with the increasing 8 
 
 
integration of China into the global economy, and bolstered by China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization in 2001. 
The vast bulk of Chinese goods exports (around 95 per cent) are manufactured 
items. Since the beginning of the economic reform period in 1978, Chinese 
merchandise exports have risen steadily from less than 1 per cent of global exports 
to around 10 per cent currently. From an initial specialisation in relatively low-tech 
items such as textiles, clothing and agricultural products, Chinese exports have 
become increasingly sophisticated, with growing market shares in machinery and 
equipment, electronics, white goods, motor vehicles and other consumer durables. 
Moreover, China has rapidly risen in significance as a centre of assembly and 
processing operations, whereby intermediate inputs are imported from overseas, 
processed or assembled into final goods and then exported to third markets. Since 
the early 1990s, processing and assembly exports (the sum of ‘processing and 
assembly’ and ‘processing with imported materials’ exports) have averaged more 
than half of total exports (Table 1).6
Table 1: Chinese Exports by Customs Classification 
 
Per cent of total merchandise exports 
  Average 
  1993–2005  2006–2009 
Processing    55    50 
   Processing and assembly    14    9 
   Processing with imported materials    41    41 
Ordinary trade    42    45 
Other    3    6 
Sources: CEIC; RBA 
 
                                           
6  Haltmaier et al (2009) show that advanced Asian economies have been supplying China with 
intermediate goods that are subsequently exported as final goods. According to Dean, Fung 
and Wang (2008), in 2002, east and south east Asian suppliers accounted for 80 per cent of 
China’s processing intermediate imports. Zhang (2008) uses Chinese firm-level data to show 
that in 2006, up to one-half  of high-income Asian economies’  exports to China were 
processed and exported to developed economies. 9 
 
 
The integration of China into global manufacturing networks means that 
fluctuations in foreign orders can rapidly lead to changes in domestic production. 
So, to the extent that growth in resource-intensive investment reflects 
developments in the manufacturing export sector, over the past couple of decades 
this investment has probably become more sensitive to developments overseas.  
3.  Industrial Uses of China’s Resource Imports  
3.1  Overview 
Although the question of what drives resource demand is related to the question of 
what drives Chinese growth overall, it is helpful to see how the resource 
commodities that China imports are actually used across industries. This can shed 
light on the direct sources of demand for resources. With the aid of input-output 
tables we can also say something about the direct and indirect effects that the 
manufacturing export sector has on resource consumption,  in terms of inter-
industry linkages. This section of the paper explores these approaches, bearing in 
mind that they only provide a snapshot of inter-industry linkages, and cannot 
properly control for international factors driving the demand for resources.  
Iron ore, aluminium ores, base metal ores and coal account for more than half of 
China’s non-oil resource imports. Chinese consumption of imported iron ore and 
coking coal is driven by steel production in China. China’s existing deposits of 
iron ore have low iron content by international standards,7
                                           
7  According to the US Geological Survey (Jorgenson 2010), China reports that its iron ore has 
an iron content of about 33 per cent, compared with a little over 60 per cent in Australia, 
Brazil and India. 
 and the majority of iron 
ore reserves are located inland in the north and west of China, which makes 
transportation to the steel mills in the more industrialised coastal areas costly. In 
addition, in 2008, more than 90 per cent of China’ crude steel was produced using 
blast furnaces and basic oxygen converters (the highest proportion in the world), 
which tend to rely on coking coal and iron ore, while comparatively little use was 
made of electric arc furnaces utilising a mix of steel scrap and other iron inputs. 
Thus the steel industry depends heavily on imported raw materials, with around 
half of China’s total iron ore supply (adjusted for differences in iron content) 
sourced from overseas.  10 
 
 
Data from various sources suggest that Chinese steel production in the 2000s is 
used in the construction (50–60 per cent), machinery (12–18 per cent), automobile 
(5–6 per cent) and home appliance (2 per cent) industries, with at least a quarter of 
domestic consumption being broadly ‘manufacturing’ (Table 2). 
Table 2: Chinese Steel Consumption by Industry 
Per cent of total steel consumption, selected years 
  2001  2005  2008 
Construction    57    55    54 
Machinery    15    12    18 
Automobile    6    5    6 
Home appliance    3    2    2 
Rail, shipping and fuel
(a)    5    5    5 
Other    15    21    15 
Note:  (a) We define ‘rail, shipping and fuel’ as the sum of the ‘container’, ‘railway’, ‘shipbuilding’ and 
‘petroleum’ categories. 
Sources:  OECD (2006) (estimates for 2001 are sourced to the China Iron and Steel Association and estimates 
for 2005 are sourced to World Steel Dynamics); data for 2008 are obtained from Wu (2009). 
 
While these estimates suggest that the bulk of steel consumption is accounted for 
by construction, it is unclear how the various sources define end-use sectors and 
their accuracy is uncertain. Earlier sectoral estimates of steel consumption 
provided by Wu (1998, 2000)  suggest  substantially  higher shares for 
manufacturing and lower shares for construction. 
Even so, the mix of steel items produced in China underscores the importance of 
construction as an end use. China’s steel industry has traditionally been weighted 
towards production of ‘long’ products and low-grade ‘flat’ products, both of which 
have important uses in residential and non-residential construction. But in addition 
to being used in construction, flat steel products – which account for a rising share 
of production – are used extensively in manufacturing, especially in appliances 
such as air conditioners and refrigerators, and in steel casing for vehicles. China’s 
automotive manufacturing sector is now the largest in the world, and (in gross 
output terms) accounted for about 7 per cent of Chinese GDP in 2009; this share 
has almost doubled over the past 12 years. 11 
 
 
China is dependent on imports for around one-third of its aluminium ore needs. 
Unlike iron ore, the bulk of aluminium ore demand is driven by the machinery, 
electronics  and transport (particularly automobile) sectors, which together have 
accounted for around half of total consumption (Hunt 2004). Turning to other base 
metals,  these  have a range of industrial uses in both the construction and 
manufacturing sectors. The chief industrial uses of copper  are for 
electrical/electronic products, engineering,  construction and automobiles 
(Tse 2009). According to the World Bank (IBRD/World Bank 2009), 44 per cent 
of China’s copper demand in 2007 was used in construction and infrastructure 
(compared to a global average of one-third). Zinc and lead have important uses in 
manufacturing – especially the automotive industry. 
3.2  Input-output Tables 
Although the assorted estimates shown above give a rough sense of the relative 
importance of manufacturing and construction as direct consumers of metal ores, 
they come from various sources and from different time periods. To avoid some of 
the problems of comparing data from inconsistent sources, we consider direct and 
indirect effects of manufacturing and construction activities on the consumption of 
resources using the official input-output tables for China. Overall, we find that 
manufacturing is a greater direct consumer of resources than construction. This is 
not surprising, as manufacturing accounts for about 40 per cent of China’s GDP 
while construction accounts for only 6 per cent.8
To compute the direct effects, we calculate the share of the ‘output’ from resource-
related industries  used as intermediate inputs in the  construction and 
manufacturing  (excluding metal products) sectors.  Metal products are excluded 
 At the same time, taking indirect 
effects into account shows that changes in manufacturing and construction may be 
equally important for resource demand. 
                                           
8  This low share for construction could partly reflect measurement error, particularly with 
regard to the overlap of classifications. A feature of the Chinese national accounts is that data 
are often collected for each enterprise as a whole. For example, the OECD (Lequiller and 
Blades 2006) reports that large state-owned enterprises may extract mineral ores, produce 
metal products, construct their own buildings and generate their own electricity. Since the 
total output and value-added of each enterprise can only be assigned to one of its activities, 
the sectoral classification is chosen on the basis of which activity accounts for the greatest 
part of the enterprise’s gross output. Given the ubiquity of construction in industry, it is likely 
that classification overlap is an issue for construction. 12 
 
 
from ‘manufacturing’ to enable a better understanding of the relationship between 
resource imports and manufacturing production.9
Figure  3  provides our estimate of  the  extent to which  domestic  ‘mining and 
quarrying’ (hereafter ‘mining’)  inputs  are  directly  used in manufacturing and 
construction, over the period 1995–2007.  Mining includes coal,  iron ore, other 
metal ores and other mining, while  manufacturing  (less metal products) is 
aggregated from individual industries. 
 We define ‘output’ as domestic 
supply  – that is, an industry’s  gross output plus imports less exports, so as to 
reflect the value of resource-related output that is available for use in the economy. 
To gauge the importance of manufacturing exports as a driver of resource demand, 
we combine these estimates with export data. We use input-output tables published 
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) from 1995 to 2005, with each 
table containing 17 industries, and update the analysis using the 42 sector table for 
2007 (see Appendix B for details). 
Figure 3: Mining – Direct Use by Industry 
Share of mining and quarrying domestic supply 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China; RBA 
                                           
9  Metal products manufacturing includes both finished and unfinished metal products 
(including raw steel), and is thus closely related to mining production and resource imports. 13 
 
 
Clearly, a larger share of the domestic supply of mining products is used directly in 
manufacturing than is used in construction, although much more manufacturing 
output is consumed domestically than is exported. The share of mining directly 
embodied in manufacturing exports is much lower, since a low share of mining 
output is used in manufacturing sectors with high export ratios (such as textiles, 
and machinery and transport).  The construction  sector  and  the  manufacturing 
export sector each directly consumed around 5 per cent of the supply of mining 
products  in 2007. However,  the majority of mining output was used as 
intermediate inputs to ‘metal products’ and ‘coal and petroleum’ (not shown in 
Figure 3). For example, iron ore – a key mining product – is not used directly in 
construction, but is used to manufacture metal products such as steel, which are in 
turn used intensively by the construction sector (consistent with Table 2). 
Indeed, a substantial proportion of metal products are themselves used as direct 
inputs to construction and manufacturing (Figure 4). The share of the domestic 
supply of metal products used in total manufacturing was almost three times higher 
than construction in 2007,  though  the construction sector  consumed a higher 
proportion of metal products than manufacturing exports. The high share for total 
manufacturing is influenced  by the use of non-ferrous metal products: the 
construction and manufacturing industries directly consumed roughly equal shares 
of the domestic steel supply in 2007. Our estimate of the share of metal products 
supply directly embodied in manufacturing exports rose strongly over the period 
1997–2005, before easing in 2007 to around 10 per cent of metal products output. 
The share of the domestic supply of coal and petroleum used in manufacturing 
exports and construction is lower than the share of metal products inputs used in 
these sectors. 14 
 
 
Figure 4: Metal Products, Coal and Petroleum – Direct Use by Industry 
Share of domestic supply 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China; RBA 
The above calculations only consider the direct shares of resource-related products 
used in other sectors. For example, it might be the case that a significant proportion 
of metal products are used as inputs to produce manufacturing equipment that is 
ultimately used by the  construction  sector. To get a rough idea of the  role  of 
indirect linkages in driving resource demand, we can  compute the ‘Leontief 
inverse’ of the NBS input-output tables to gauge the effect of a one unit rise in 
construction and manufacturing final demand on different  resource-related 
inputs.10
Figure 5 presents the results of the calculation for metal products. It suggests that 
accounting for indirect linkages between industries makes a big  difference 
(compare the left-hand panel of Figure 4). Over 1995–2007, a one unit increase in 
the final demand of the construction sector typically resulted in a larger increase in 
metal products output than a one unit increase in manufacturing final demand. 
 
                                           
10 For further details, please refer to Appendix B. We do not compute a separate effect for a rise 
in manufacturing export demand, since the NBS input-output tables do not distinguish 
between a change in final demand for manufactures that are exported and a change in final 
demand for manufactures that are consumed domestically. 15 
 
 
However, the effect of a rise in manufacturing demand on metal products output 
increased strongly over this period, and by 2005 was equal to the effect of an 
increase in construction demand. The effects of higher demand for manufacturing 
and construction had both increased further by 2007. These results suggest that 
while a unit of manufacturing requires a higher direct input of metal products than 
a unit of construction, construction requires a substantial input of manufactured 
items that themselves use metal product inputs intensively. Moreover, the total 
(direct plus indirect) effect of higher final demand in construction and 
manufacturing has risen since the mid 1990s, suggesting a rise in the intensity with 
which metal products were used over this period. 
Figure 5: Metal Products – Use by Sector 
Effect of a one unit increase in final demand 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China; RBA 
To summarise, our  analysis of input-output  tables  indicates  that the share of 
resource/metal product inputs directly used in  manufacturing exports has risen, 
while the share of these inputs used in construction has trended downwards slightly 
over  the  1995–2007  period.  Accounting for indirect  effects via inter-industry 
linkages, metal products are used more intensively in construction than their direct 
input-output shares would suggest. This exercise also indicates that the impact of a 
one unit increase in final demand,  in either construction or manufacturing,  on 16 
 
 
metal products production has been increasing over time. However, when we 
consider the much larger scale of the manufacturing sector, it seems clear that 
manufacturing has been at least  as important, if not more important, than 
construction as a  source of Chinese resource demand.  In the next section we 
estimate a model of trade in resources in order to test  the importance of 
manufacturing exports as a driver of China’s resource imports. 
4.  Explaining Chinese Resource Imports 
To examine global trade in non-oil resource commodities11
4.1  Modelling Trade in Resources – Estimation Strategy 
 we use the gravity 
model, which predicts that trade between two countries is positively related to their 
economic size and negatively related to the cost of transportation (typically proxied 
by the distance between the two countries’ capital cities). We proceed in three 
stages. First, we estimate a baseline equation explaining bilateral resource imports 
using an unbalanced panel of 180  economies  over the period 1980 to 2008. 
Second, we adjust the equation to separate out the effects of importing country 
domestic expenditure, domestic investment and exports on resource imports. We 
then use a dummy variable to test if –  controlling for other determinants of 
commodity trade –  China’s  imports of resources depend on its (mainly 
manufacturing) exports, and whether this relationship is different for China than 
for other resource importers. 
Our data consist of an unbalanced panel of real bilateral non-oil resource imports, 
real GDP, real expenditure components of GDP and population for 180 economies 
over 1980–2008 (see Appendix E for details). We start by estimating a baseline 
gravity model for resource imports. This includes both country-pair fixed effects 
and time-fixed effects, and is estimated using ordinary least squares. The real level 
                                           
11 Our focus on non-oil resources (metal ores and coal) reflects our interest in the effect of 
China’s resource demand in countries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada and India. It also 
recognises that the market for crude oil and petroleum may be sufficiently different to 
constitute a separate object of study. The decision to include coal could be questioned on the 
grounds that it is qualitatively different from metal ores, and is used for energy generation as 
well as, for example, the production of metal products. However, additional analysis (not 
reported here) indicates that the results of this paper are robust to redefining ‘non-oil resource 
commodities’ as metal ores alone. 17 
 
 
of resource imports (
R
ijt M ), by country i from country j, in year t is expressed as 
follows: 
 
3 12 4 t ij ijt R
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where GDP refers to real gross domestic product, and pop refers to population. 
Although some authors enter real GDP per capita as a dependent variable rather 
than including GDP and population separately, it is also common  to leave the 
coefficients on population unconstrained. The time-fixed effect (αt) is a dummy 
variable  for each time period, capturing common global trends, such as 
macroeconomic shocks and commodity prices. The country-pair fixed effect (αij) 
captures all factors without time variation that affect the volume of trade between 
two countries; for example, relative differences in resource endowments and the 
distance between two countries. Country-pair fixed effects are included because 
they can eliminate substantial bias in gravity models (Cheng and Wall 2005).12
 
 To 
estimate this equation using least squares, we take the log of both sides, resulting 
in the following specification: 
1 234 ln ln ln ln ln
R
ijt ij jt it jt it t ijt M GDP GDP pop pop α β β β β αε =+ + + + ++  (1) 
To examine the extent to which  –  controlling for other factors –  commodity 
imports are correlated with individual components of importing country GDP, such 
as domestic expenditure on consumption and investment, and exports, we need to 
include these components in the specification. 
We know from the accounting identity that: 
  X M GNE M X G I C GDP + − = − + + + = ) (    
                                           
12 Cheng and Wall argue that one could estimate the effect of distance on trade indirectly by 
conducting a second stage regression of the country-pair fixed effects obtained from the first 
stage regression on the distance between countries i and j and a variety of other time-invariant 
explanators of bilateral trade. This approach is problematic, however, because if the inclusion 
of these time-invariant explanators in the first stage regression would lead to omitted variables 
bias, there is also reason to believe that the same problem would be present in the second 
stage regression. Notwithstanding this criticism, if we follow  the  two-stage approach,  a 




where: C, I, G, X and M refer to household consumption, gross capital formation, 
government consumption, total exports and total imports, and GNE refers to gross 
national expenditure. Our hypothesis is that a country’s resource imports are 
correlated with a combination of gross national expenditure less imports (hereafter 
GNE−M) and exports.13 GDP is an unweighted linear combination (the sum) of 
these components; however, a priori, the nature of their relationship with resource 
imports is unknown. While it would be convenient to assume that resource imports 
were a function of a  weighted  arithmetic average of GNE–M  and  X  in the 
importing country, identifying the weights of this average would be problematic in 
least squares estimation.14
 
 Assuming that resource imports are correlated with a 
geometric average of these two variables at least allows  the weights to be 
identified, and allows for the possibility of a nonlinear relationship. Therefore, we 
also propose the following gravity equation: 
( )
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We estimate this equation in the log form: 
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  (2) 
It may seem unusual to include a trade variable on both the right- and left-hand-
sides of the estimated equations. But the fact that we are regressing resource 
                                           
13 The decision to subtract imports from GNE could be criticised on the grounds that imports are 
used in the production of goods for export as well as being absorbed by household 
consumption and investment. Ideally, one would want to subtract imports from the 
expenditure components corresponding to their actual use. This criticism may be relevant in 
the case of China, where a large proportion of imports are processed and then exported to 
other countries. But it is likely to be less relevant for countries where processing trade is not 
pervasive and exports mainly rely on domestic intermediate inputs. Owing to the difficulty of 
separating processing from non-processing imports across such a large sample, we leave 
testing the empirical importance of this issue to future work. 
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  While the coefficient of δ may be identified by taking logs of both sides, yielding the separate 
term ( ) 12 ln ( )it it GNE M X δπ π −+ , the relative weights  of expenditure less imports and 
exports (π1 and π2) cannot be directly estimated. 19 
 
 
imports by country i from country j on country i’s total exports to the rest of the 
world means that endogeneity is unlikely to be a serious problem. As an additional 
precaution, for each economy we also subtract its imports of resources from total 
imports. This ensures that the dependent variable is not appearing on both sides of 
the equation, though for most economies the share of resources in total imports is 
small. For China, this share was a little more than 2 per cent until 2004, but even 
today, resources still account for only around 10 per cent of total imports. 
We can perform a similar exercise to consider the effect that investment, on its 
own, has on resource imports, by including GDP less investment (hereafter 
GDP−I) and investment (I) separately on the right-hand-side of the equation: 
  ( ) 11 2
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  (3) 
As we are particularly interested in the determinants of China’s resources imports, 
we adjust Equation (1) to examine whether China’s imports of commodities are 
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where the variable Chinai is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the importing 
country is China. Hence, β2 + γ is the total marginal effect of an increase in China’s 
GDP on its resource imports. 
Using this framework we can also ask whether China’s commodity imports are 
more responsive to the ‘domestic’ components of GDP or exports than are the 
resource imports of other economies: 
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Finally, we also  augment Equation (3) with China  dummies, to consider the 
responsiveness of China’s resource imports to investment on its own: 
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 (3A) 
As the gravity model is estimated in log form, the model cannot be estimated for 
observations with zero trade flows.  Thus, all observations without trade are 
excluded from the regressions.15
4.2   Results 
 To prevent economies with very little resource 
trade having an undue influence on the results, we also exclude all observations 
where real resource imports were particularly small. 
Table  3  presents regression results for resource imports.  The three ‘Baseline’ 
columns present the results for Equations (1) to (3) without China dummies, while 
the three ‘China effect’  columns  report results including  China  dummies 
(Equations (1A)  to  (3A)). While all regressions were estimated with time and 
country-pair fixed effects, for the sake of brevity these coefficients are not 
reported.16
                                           
15 It is standard to exclude zero trade flows (that is, observations for which imports by country i 
from country j are zero) from the gravity model. However, this may bias our estimates if zero 
flows in resource trade do not occur randomly – that is, if countries that have lower GDP, or 
are further apart, are less likely to trade. Rauch (1999) argues that excluding zero trade flows 
may underestimate the magnitudes of these coefficients. To deal with zero flows, a number of 
papers estimate the gravity model in its non-linear form with an additive error term (for 
example, Westerlund and Wilhelmsson 2006). Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) derive 
a two stage estimation procedure, by first estimating a probit model on the probability of trade 
between two countries, and then using these estimates to estimate a gravity equation in log-
linear form. 
 
16 For  all equations, we correct for heteroskedasticity using an Eicker-Huber-White robust 
standard errors estimator that clusters standard errors at the country-pair level. As discussed 
by Klein and Shambaugh (2006, p 369), this allows for different variances across the country 
pairs and for serial correlation within country pairs. In general, this is the approach advocated 
by Stock and Watson (2006). 21 
 
 
Table 3: Gravity Model Results for Resource Imports 
  Baseline    China effect 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (1A)  (2A)  (3A) 
GDPjt   0.71***  0.78***  0.72***    0.72***  0.78***  0.73*** 
GDPit  1.67***        1.40***     
GDPit ×Chinai          0.88***     
Xit    0.98***        0.83***   
Xit ×Chinai            0.12   
(GNE−M)it    0.13***        0.08**   
(GNE−M)it×Chinai            0.99   
Iit      0.52***        0.46*** 
Iit×Chinai              0.51 
(GDP−I)it      0.98***        0.76*** 
(GDP−I)it×Chinai              0.48 
popjt  0.00  −0.08  0.02    −0.02  −0.10  −0.01 
popit  0.08  0.88***  0.24    0.26  0.95***  0.43** 
Adjusted R
2  0.75  0.76  0.75    0.75  0.76  0.75 
Observations  85 025  79 867  85 006    85 025  79 867  85 006 
Notes:  Model estimated with robust standard errors. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 per cent levels  respectively. Data cover bilateral trade between 180 economies  over  the  period 
1980–2008. Country-pair fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but omitted 
from this table. Resource imports are excluded from aggregate imports (M).  
 
Overall, Table 3 suggests that the estimated equations display a reasonable fit to 
the data. The adjusted R-squared values of around 0.75 are comparable to other 
gravity studies, although it is likely that the R-squared
 will be inflated by excluding 
zero observations on trade from the regressions. 
As an aside, before discussing the results it is worth considering the issue of 
nonstationarity, which  is potentially a concern for the panel data used in our 
estimation. Spurious correlation is less of a problem in panel data models than in 
time series analysis,  as the fixed effects estimator for non-stationary data is 
asymptotically normal, although  the results may still be biased (Kao and 
Chiang 2000; Fidrmuc 2009). Fidrmuc finds that gravity models estimated with 
fixed effects perform relatively well compared with models estimated using panel 
cointegration techniques that explicitly account for non-stationary variables and the 
long-run relationship between trade and output. 22 
 
 
In our case, the highly unbalanced nature of the panel makes testing for unit roots 
and cointegration in the data problematic. Nonetheless, for the variables entering 
Equations (1) and (2), we can still construct a balanced sub-sample and test for 
panel unit roots and cointegration.17
Turning to the results, Equation (1) implies that a 1 per cent increase in importing 
country GDP increases the volume of resource imports by 1.7 per cent, and that 
this effect is statistically significant. Exporter country GDP has a smaller, and also 
highly significant, effect on resource trade in all equations. 
 We performed three separate panel unit root 
tests:  the  Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), and Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003) tests. While the results for each variable vary somewhat depending on 
the test used, they suggest that all of the variables entering Equations (1) and (2) 
potentially  contain panel unit roots  (see Appendix D).  The Breitung  test, in 
particular,  indicates  that all variables are non-stationary. To test whether the 
relationships specified by Equations (1) and (2) are cointegrating, we tested for 
panel cointegration using two approaches: the Pedroni (1999, 2004) tests, and the 
Kao (1999) test. For both equations, the results strongly reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration. Given that the power of these tests might be limited, as a 
further check we estimated Equations (1) and (2) with all variables entered in (log) 
first differences. The results of  this exercise are  qualitatively similar to those 
presented in Table 3, suggesting that even if the variables contained unit roots but 
were  not cointegrated,  our findings would not change substantially (see 
Appendix D). 
The results for Equation (2) imply that a country’s resource imports are highly 
correlated with its aggregate exports, controlling for fixed effects and GDP in the 
resource exporting country. Somewhat surprisingly, while statistically significant, 
the effect of domestic expenditure (GNE less imports) is small. Similar results are 
obtained when the gravity equation  is estimated in first differences (see 
Appendix D). 
The finding that a country’s imports of resources are in general highly correlated 
with its total exports is striking. But it is certainly true that resources are used 
intensively in the production of many traded goods. A strong correlation between 
                                           
17 Our sub-sample contains more than 750 country-pairs, over the period 1987–2008 (we 
truncate the time period to include data for China). 23 
 
 
resource imports and total exports is also consistent with the empirical observation 
of Garnaut and Song (2006, 2007) that resource demand is often related to the size 
of a country’s export sector. They find that this has particularly been the case in 
north east Asian economies with poor resource endowments. 
One possibility is that our results are biased in favour of a strong export effect (and 
a weak expenditure effect) because the sample includes many developing 
economies with poor resource endowments that have pursued an export-oriented 
development strategy. But this explanation can be easily ruled out. As we show 
below, the marginal effect of exports on resource imports is actually stronger than 
average in the case of developed countries such as the United States, Canada and 
Germany. Moreover, if we interact a ‘development’ dummy variable – set equal to 
one if an economy is ‘developing’ and zero otherwise – with the variables GNE–M 
and X, we find that the coefficient on exports is no different for a developing 
economy than for a developed economy (the estimated difference is –0.05, and it is 
statistically insignificant; see Table C2). In contrast, the coefficient on GNE–M is 
higher for developing economies (the estimated difference is 0.33, with a p-value 
of 0.00).  One  possible  explanation for  this pattern might run as follows. For 
countries that rely on consumption rather than investment to propel growth (such 
as the United States), one might expect resource imports to have a relatively low 
correlation with domestic expenditure, as consumption is presumably less 
resource-intensive than investment. For countries with high investment shares of 
GDP (such as China or India), the opposite could be expected. While resource 
imports are in general likely to rise as a country boosts its manufacturing exports, 
one would also  expect developing economies  with  policies  favouring  capital 
formation  to import relatively more resources than  consumption-focused 
developed economies. 
However,  if resource trade is correlated with aggregate trade, one could also 
question whether there is anything to be gained by including total exports, rather 
than total imports, on the right-hand-side of the estimated equation. To check this, 
we separately estimate the following equation: 
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This equation is comparable to Equation (2), except that we split GDP into GNE 
plus exports,  and imports. Once again we remove resource imports from total 
imports for each economy. The results for this equation, and for the analogue of 
Equation (2A) are reported in Table C3. Briefly, we find that an  economy’s 
aggregate imports have a (borderline) significant and positive effect on its resource 
imports. However, this effect is about a fifth of the size of the effect reported for 
exports in the second column of Table 3. Furthermore, GNE plus exports has a 
much  larger  and more significant effect on resource imports than aggregate 
imports. In other words, an economy’s resource imports are generally more highly 
correlated with its aggregate exports than with its aggregate imports (less resource 
imports), controlling for other determinants of trade. This supports our choice to 
split resource-importer GDP into exports and GNE less imports, and our emphasis 
on the results in Table 3. 
Turning to  our alternative decomposition of GDP, Equation (3) shows that 
investment on its own also has a significant and positive effect on an economy’s 
resource imports, although the effect is smaller than that of GDP less investment. 
A positive effect for investment is hardly surprising since much capital investment 
is resource-intensive. What is interesting is that the effect is quantitatively smaller 
than it is for the other expenditure components of GDP. It is likely that this reflects 
the strong relationship between resource trade and aggregate total exports (now 
included in GDP–I) revealed by the estimation results for Equation (2). 
Focusing on determinants of China’s resources imports, the effect of China’s GDP 
on its imports of resources is larger than the effect of other economies’ GDP on 
their imports of resources, on average. This effect is large and highly significant. A 
1 per cent increase in China’s GDP results in a 2.3 per cent increase in its resource 
imports, compared with an average effect of 1.4 per cent for the rest of the world. 
The high coefficient on GDP may reflect a particularly resource-intensive pattern 
of development in China, and is consistent with the rapid rise in China’s steel 
intensity in the past decade or so (documented by, for example, McKay et al 2010). 
Equation (2A) suggests that China’s exports have a slightly larger effect on its 
resource imports relative to the average effect observed for other countries. The 
additional marginal effect of Chinese exports (that is, the coefficient on Xit×Chinai) 
is not statistically significant, but a Wald test finds that the total marginal effect of 
Chinese exports on Chinese imports of resources (the sum of coefficients on Xit 25 
 
 
and Xit×Chinai) is statistically significant. While the effect of China’s domestic 
expenditure (GNE–M) on its resource imports is larger than it is for the rest of the 
world, it is not statistically significant, and is not substantially larger than the effect 
of China’s aggregate exports on Chinese imports of resources. 
Finally, when we decompose GDP into investment and GDP less investment 
(Equation (3A)), it is clear that the additional marginal effect of Chinese 
investment (the coefficient on Iit×Chinai) is not statistically significant, and that the 
same is true of the additional effect of Chinese GDP less investment. A Wald test 
finds that the total marginal effect of Chinese investment on resource imports is 
weakly significant (at the 10 per cent level), and that the same is true of the total 
marginal effect of Chinese GDP less investment. This suggests that, as for other 
economies in the sample, investment is a significant driver of resource imports by 
China; however, as we have seen from Equation (2A), Chinese exports are also a 
significant source of demand for resource commodities. 
Overall, the results indicate  that Chinese GDP exerts  a larger influence on its 
resource imports than is the case for other economies, on average, in our sample. 
To confirm that this is the case, we conduct separate regressions of Equations (1A) 
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The results are shown in Table 4, with only the additional marginal effects reported 
(that is, the coefficients of γ ,  1 φ  and  2 φ  from the above equations). 26 
 
 
Table 4: Gravity Model Results for Resource Imports by Country 
  Equation (1A*)    Equation (2A*) 
  GDPit×countryi    (GNE−M)it×countryi  Xit×countryi 
China  0.88***    0.99  0.12 
Japan  −0.49    1.68**  −0.85*** 
South Korea  −0.03    0.10  −0.05 
Germany  2.74***    0.25  0.22 
US  0.20    −2.09**  0.95** 
UK  −0.14    0.73  −0.15 
Italy  0.76    1.56  −0.03 
France  −0.16    −1.00  0.06 
Canada  −0.82    −2.70***  0.42 
Spain  0.05    −0.39  0.10 
India  0.81***    1.26*  −0.30 
Notes:  Model estimated with robust standard errors. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 per cent levels  respectively. Data cover bilateral trade between 180  economies  over  the  period 
1980–2008. Country-pair fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but omitted 
from this table. Resource imports are excluded from aggregate imports (M). Countries other than China 
are listed in order of their total resource imports over 1980–2008, from largest to smallest. China would 
be second on this list. 
 
Table 4 shows that, controlling for other determinants of trade, resource imports 
are more highly correlated with GDP in the case of China than for several other 
major resource importers, including Japan, South Korea and the United States. At 
the same time, the effect for China is not so large compared with these other 
countries as to seem implausible. The effect of GDP on resource imports reflects 
different factors in different countries. For example, the resource imports of Japan 
and,  to a  lesser extent,  India  are  more strongly correlated with their domestic 
expenditure and less correlated with their exports than is the case for the rest of the 
world. In contrast, the resource imports of the US appear to be more strongly 
correlated with aggregate exports than is the case  for other major resource 
importers, while they are much less correlated with domestic expenditure. Looking 
at the specific effect of exports on resource trade across countries, China’s 
coefficient on exports is larger than is the case for countries such as Japan, India 
and the UK, but smaller than it is for the US, Germany and Canada. Thus, the 
additional marginal effect of exports for China lies well within the range observed 
for other major resource importers. 27 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This  paper provides evidence that China’s manufacturing exports have been a 
significant  driver  of its demand for resource  commodities. Data on Chinese 
investment  indicate that manufacturing was the strongest driver of growth in 
Chinese investment prior to the recent global financial crisis. Analysis of input-
output tables shows that,  over the past decade or so, the manufacturing sector 
(which accounts for most of China’s exports) has been  more important than 
construction as a direct consumer of resources and intermediate metal products. 
Accounting for indirect linkages between industries, it is found that manufacturing 
has been at least as important as construction as a source of demand for metal 
products. 
Econometric results based on a gravity model of resource trade show that, 
controlling for domestic expenditure (including investment), exports are in general 
a significant determinant of a country’s non-oil resource imports, and that this has 
been  true for China  as well as for other countries.  This implies that China’s 
resource demand is influenced by developments in the rest of the world. Consistent 
with the resource-intensive nature of much investment, the results also indicate – in 
China and elsewhere – a significant role for investment as a source of resource 
demand. This is in line  with previous literature highlighting  a dual role for 
investment and exports as drivers of demand for resource commodities. However, 
it appears that, over recent decades, a sizeable proportion of China’s investment 
can be traced to the growth of its domestic and export-oriented manufacturing 
operations. Thus, while much of China’s demand for resource commodities over 
this period has been driven by investment, it appears that this investment has in 
turn been sensitive to global influences. 28 
 
 
Appendix A: Fixed Asset Investment Data by Sector 
Obtaining estimates of investment by sector for China is not straightforward. We 
use fixed asset investment (FAI) data, as disaggregated data on gross fixed capital 
formation are unavailable. FAI includes purchases of land, and existing structures 
and equipment (which should be excluded from GDP); this means these data are 
generally biased from a national accounting perspective.  We proceed on the 
assumption that industry shares of gross fixed capital formation are similar to those 
for FAI. More seriously, a major change in classifications and in the scope of 
measured expenditure and output in 2004–2005, following the 2004 economic 
census, means that internally consistent series of investment by industry are not 
available over the longer term. From 1996 onwards, monthly data on total urban 
FAI by industry is available. Prior to that, there is only incomplete industry detail 
on investment in capital construction and innovation by industry, which is defined 
as FAI less investment in real estate development, urban private housing projects 
and rural FAI (NBS 2004).18
While the changes in classifications around 2004 mean that long-term series for 
individual industries cannot be reliably constructed, we can aggregate industries 
into broader classifications to get a rough idea of the relative roles of large sectoral 
groupings. Barnett and Brooks (2006) decompose urban  FAI since 2004 into 
manufacturing,  infrastructure  and  real estate  (which together account for 
85 per cent of FAI according to their classification). Owing to the break in the data, 
and in the interests of obtaining a longer time series, we do not exactly replicate 
the decomposition of Barnett and Brooks for manufacturing and infrastructure 
investment, although our results for the post-2004 period are similar to theirs. 
 Owing to large differences between the FAI and the 
capital construction and innovation data, and the lack of industry detail for real 
estate and ‘other’ investment, we focus on developments since the mid 1990s. 
Our definition of manufacturing is the same as that of Barnett and Brooks from 
2004 onwards, since it is given as a complete category in the FAI by industry data. 
Prior to 2004, we define manufacturing as ‘secondary industry’ less ‘energy’ and 
‘construction’. Barnett and Brooks define ‘infrastructure’ investment as the sum of 
                                           
18 Capital construction investment refers to new or ‘extension’ construction projects with a total 
investment of CNY500 000 or greater. Innovation investment refers to technological 
improvements of existing facilities or renewal of fixed assets. 29 
 
 
FAI in electricity, gas & water; transport, storage & post; water conservancy & 
environmental management; education; health, social security &  welfare; and 
public administration & social organisations. From 2004, we follow the definition 
of Barnett and Brooks, except that we omit public administration  & social 
organisations and include culture, sport & entertainment. Given the higher level of 
aggregation in the pre-2004 data, before 2004 we define infrastructure as the sum 
of ‘industry: energy’, transport, storage & telecommunications; culture, education 
& health care; and ‘other’ (since infrastructure-related categories that did not exist 
prior to 2004 such as water conservancy & environmental management were 
included in this category). Including investment in the ‘construction’ industry itself 
would make little difference to the calculation as it is small (around 1 per cent of 
total FAI), but we omit it as it is not clear that it constitutes ‘infrastructure’ 
investment as such. Since a (discontinued) urban real estate investment category is 
available prior to the 2004 reclassification, we use this series to extend the real 
estate FAI series back to 1996.19
   
 
                                           
19 Barnett and Brooks (2006, p 29) use a ‘wider definition of real estate investment than in the 
FAI survey and estimated  …  to include investment in residential buildings beyond that 
undertaken by real estate developers’. We do not adopt this strategy owing to uncertainty 
regarding how residential building investment is allocated across industries. 30 
 
 
Appendix B: Input-output Analysis 
To compare the relative roles of manufacturing and construction as consumers of 
resources over time, we employ the 17 industry input-output (I-O) tables published 
by the NBS for the years 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2005, and collapse a 
42 sector table published by the NBS (a version of the 135 sector table) for 2007 
into a comparable 17 industry table. Table B1 shows how we have reclassified 
industries to contract the 42 sector I-O table. 
These I-O tables do not distinguish between imported and domestically produced 
intermediate goods. To estimate the share of resources used as inputs to 
construction and manufacturing, we assume that  the intensity in the use of 
imported inputs is the same for production for exports and production for domestic 
sales. This assumption has been used in the literature to construct separate 
intermediate use tables for imports and domestic production (see Dean et al 2008 
for a discussion). 
Construction is defined as a separate industry in the I-O tables, and we define 
manufacturing as ‘machinery and equipment’, ‘chemicals’, ‘building materials and 
non-metal mineral products’, ‘textile, sewing, leather and fur products’, and ‘other 
manufacturing’  industries.  Metal products manufacturing includes both finished 
and unfinished metal products (including raw steel), and is thus closely related to 
mining production and resource imports. Consequently, we exclude this sector 
from ‘manufacturing’ to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between 
resource imports and manufacturing production. 
We look at the direct  uses of products from  three resource-related industries: 
‘mining and quarrying’, ‘metal products’, and ‘coal and petroleum’. For these three 
industries, their direct  use is defined as the share of domestic supply  used as 
intermediate inputs in the construction and manufacturing sectors. We define the 
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where: Y, M, and X and are gross output, imports and exports (of industry j); 
(Y +M –X) is domestic supply; and  ij y  is the gross output of industry j consumed 
by industry i. 
To estimate the direct use of resource-related industries’ products by the 
manufacturing export sector, we multiply the ratio of exports to gross output for 
each manufacturing industry k (where k = 1...5) by its share of resource-related 
industry j’s domestic supply. We then sum over k to obtain the total direct use of 
resource-related products by the manufacturing export sector. Denoting the direct 
use of products supplied by resource-related industry j to the manufacturing export 
sector as 
X
manj α , and the export-to-gross output ratio for manufacturing industry k as 













+− ∑    
To look at indirect effects of manufacturing and construction demand on the output 
of ‘metal products’, we calculate the effect of a one unit increase in manufacturing 
and construction final demand on ‘metal products’ gross output. This is done by 
computing the Leontief inverse of the direct input coefficient matrix from China’s 
I-O tables over the 1995–2007 period. 
First, denote the final demand of industry j as cj. Second, denote the share of the 
gross output of industry j used by industry i as δij. An industry j’s gross output (that 
is, intermediate use plus final demand) can be written as: 
 
n






 ∑    
Denoting the direct input coefficient matrix as A, and the vectors of final demand 
























   
we can summarise the input-output table as follows: 
 
( ) C D I





   
where  ( )
1 − − D I  is the Leontief inverse. Element ij of  ( )
1 − − D I , say Tij, is the 
impact of a one unit increase in ci (the final demand of industry i) on Yj (the gross 
output of industry j). Tij is the total effect coefficient of an increase in final demand 
in industry i on the gross output of industry j. In effect, the coefficient Tij estimates 
the output of ‘metal products’ required both directly and indirectly to produce an 
extra unit of ‘manufacturing’ or ‘construction’ final demand. See Miller and 
Blair (2009, Chapter 2) for further discussion of this exercise. 
To calculate the effect of a one unit increase in manufacturing final demand, we 
weight each of the five manufacturing sub-industries’ total effect coefficients by 
the manufacturing sub-industries’ respective shares of total manufacturing final 
demand. We do not compute a separate effect for a rise in manufacturing export 
demand, since the NBS I-O tables do not allow us to distinguish between a change 
in final demand for manufactures that are exported and a change in final demand 
for manufactures that are consumed domestically. 
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Table B1: Industry Reclassification for the 2007 17 Sector I-O Table 
(continued next page) 
42 sector industry  17 sector industry 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery 
Agriculture 
Mining and washing of coal  Mining and quarrying 
Extraction of petroleum and natural gas  Mining and quarrying 
Mining of metal ores  Mining and quarrying 
Mining and processing of non-metal ores and 
other ores 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacture of foods and tobacco  Foodstuffs 
Manufacture of textiles  Textile, sewing, leather and fur products 
Manufacture of textile wearing apparel, 
footwear, caps, leather, fur, feather (down) 
and its products 
Textile, sewing, leather and fur products 
Processing of timbers and manufacture of 
furniture 
Other manufacturing 
Papermaking, printing and manufacture of 
articles for culture, education and sports 
activities 
Other manufacturing 
Processing of petroleum, coking, processing 
of nuclear fuel 
Coking, gas and petroleum refining 
Chemical industry  Chemical industry 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 
products  
Building materials and non-metal mineral 
products 
Smelting and rolling of metals  Metal products 
Manufacture of metal products  Metal products 
Manufacture of general purpose and special 
purpose machinery 
Machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of transport equipment  Machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
equipment 
Machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of communication equipment, 
computer and other electronic equipment 
Machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of measuring instrument and 
machinery for cultural activity and office work 
Machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of artwork, other manufacture  Other manufacturing 
Scrap and waste  Other manufacturing 
Production and supply of electric power and 
heat power 
Production and supply of electric power, heat 
power and water 34 
 
 
Table B1: Industry Reclassification for the 2007 17 Sector I-O Table 
(continued) 
42 sector industry  17 sector industry 
Production and distribution of gas  Coking, gas and petroleum refining 
Production and distribution of water  Production and supply of electric power, heat 
power and water 
Construction  Construction 
Traffic, transport and storage  Transportation, postal and telecommunication 
services 
Post  Transportation, postal and telecommunication 
services 
Information transmission, computer 
services and software 
Real estate
(a) 
Wholesale and retail trade  Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and catering 
services 
Hotels and catering services  Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and catering 
services 
Financial intermediation  Banking and insurance 
Real estate  Real estate 
Leasing and business services  Real estate 
Research and experimental development  Other services 
Comprehensive technical services  Other services 
Management of water conservancy, 
environment and public facilities 
Other services 
Services to households and other services  Other services 
Education  Other services 
Health, social security and social welfare  Other services 
Culture, sports and entertainment  Other services 
Public management and social organisation  Other services 
Notes:  (a) It appears that ‘information transmission, computer services and software’ was classified as part of 
‘real estate’ in the 2002 17 sector I-O table. Although we have reservations about the decision to 





Appendix C: Gravity Model Variables and Supplementary Results 
Table C1: List of Variables Used in Regressions 
Coefficient    Description 
R
ijt M     volume of bilateral resource imports by country i from country j 
αt    time dummy intercept, specific to year t and common to all trading 
partners 
αij    country-pair fixed effect, a dummy variable for each pair of trading 
partners in all years (note that αij ≠ αji) 
GDPit    real GDP of country i at time t 
popit    population of country i at time t 
Xit    real exports of country i at time t 
(GNE−M)it    real gross national expenditure less imports of country i at time t 
Mit    total real imports of country i at time t 
(GNE+X)it    real gross national expenditure plus exports of country i at time t 
Iit    real gross capital formation of country i at time t 




Table C2: Gravity Model Results for Resource Imports 
  Baseline    Developing country effect 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (1A)  (2A)  (3A) 
GDPjt  0.71***  0.78***  0.72***    0.71***  0.78***  0.72*** 




          0.24**     
Xit    0.98***        0.96***   
Xit×Developingi 
(a)            −0.05   
(GNE−M)it    0.13***        0.01   
(GNE−M)it 
×Developingi 
(a)            0.33***   
Iit      0.52***        0.28*** 
Iit×Developingi 
(a)              0.39*** 
(GDP−I)it      0.98***        1.07*** 
(GDP−I)it 
×Developingi 
(a)              −0.22* 
popjt  0.00  −0.08  0.02    0.02  −0.09  0.03 
popit  0.08  0.88***  0.24    0.00  0.79***  0.20 
Adjusted R
2  0.75  0.76  0.75    0.75  0.76  0.75 
Observations  85 025  79 867  85 006    85 025  79 867  85 006 
Notes:  Model estimated with robust standard errors. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 per cent levels respectively. Data cover bilateral trade between 180 economies  over  the  period 
1980–2008. Country-pair fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but omitted 
from this table. Resource imports are excluded from aggregate imports (M). 
(a) An economy is classified as developing if it does not appear on the World Bank’s list of ‘high-income 
economies’. Note that the list of developed and developing economies does not change over the 
sample. 
   37 
 
 
Table C3: Gravity Model Results for Resource Imports 
Alternative decomposition of GDP into GNE+X and M 
  Baseline    China effect 
  (1)  (2)    (1A)  (2A) 
GDPjt  0.71***  0.71***    0.72***  0.72*** 
GDPit  1.67***      1.40***   
GDPit×Chinai        0.88***   
Mit    0.18*      0.20** 
Mit×Chinai          0.34 
(GNE+X)it    1.24***      1.00*** 
(GNE+X)it×Chinai          0.43 
popjt  0.00  0.01    −0.01  −0.02 
popit  0.08  0.57***    0.86***  0.70*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.75  0.75    0.75  0.75 
Observations  85 025  85 025    85 025  85 025 
Notes:  Model estimated with robust standard errors. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 per cent levels  respectively. Data cover bilateral trade between 180  economies  over  the  period 
1980–2008. Country-pair fixed effects and time-fixed effects are included in all regressions, but omitted 




Appendix D: Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests  
The Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Breitung (2000) panel unit root tests specify a 
null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of no unit root (across all 
cross-sections). The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test employs the null hypothesis 
of a unit root against the alternative that some cross-sections do not contain a unit 
root. Table D1 shows the results of these tests with fixed effects, time trends and 
two lags. 
Table D1: Panel Unit Root Tests 
  LLC  Breitung  IPS 
R
ijt M   8.23  0.93  –4.73*** 
GDPjt  –3.04***  13.53  –11.03*** 
GDPit  –1.97**  15.31  –12.95*** 
Xit  13.82  10.17  10.12 
(GNE–M)it  –5.80***  22.66  –0.08 
popjt  34.63  31.63  15.10 
popit  29.32  36.24  22.66 
Notes:  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively. Data cover 
bilateral trade between 777 country-pairs for the period 1987–2008, with all variables in logs. 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposes several panel cointegration tests that extend the 
Engle-Granger (Engle and Granger 1987) cointegration framework. Table D2 
reports the panel Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller 1979) test statistics 
for two of these tests: first, the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the 
alternative of cointegration with common autoregressive coefficients for all 
country-pairs; and second, the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the 
alternative of cointegration with individual autoregressive coefficients for all 
country-pairs. The Pedroni tests are implemented with fixed effects and two lags. 
The Kao (1999)  test also extends the Engle-Granger two-stage cointegration 
framework, testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of 
cointegration with common autoregressive coefficients for all country-pairs. 39 
 
 
Table D2: Panel Cointegration Tests 












Equation (1)  –5.59***  –10.08***  –0.56 
Equation (2)  –3.91***  –8.24***  –4.33*** 
Notes:  *** represents statistical significance at the 1 per cent level. Data cover bilateral trade between 777 
country-pairs for the period 1987–2008, with all variables in logs. 
 
Table D3: Gravity Model Results for Resource Imports 
Equation (1) in log differenced form 
  Baseline    China effect 








GDPjt  0.16  0.21    0.16  0.21 
GDPit  1.66***  1.80***    1.60***  1.75*** 
GDPit×Chinai        –0.03  –0.05 
popjt  1.80***  1.79***    1.79***  1.78*** 
popit  0.23  0.20    0.27  0.23 
Adjusted R
2  0.002  0.004    0.002  0.004 
Observations  66 782  66 782    66 782  66 782 
Notes:  Model estimated with robust standard errors. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 per cent levels  respectively. Data cover bilateral trade between 180  economies  for the period 
1980–2008.  Resource imports are excluded from aggregate imports (M). For regressions with China 
dummy interactions, the China dummy was also included on its own (because country-pair fixed effects 




Table D4: Gravity Model Results for Resource Imports 
Equation (2) in log differenced form 
  Baseline    China effect 








GDPjt  0.25*  0.25*    0.26*  0.25* 
Xit  0.32***  0.38***    0.27***  0.33*** 
Xit×Chinai        –0.13  –0.13 
(GNE−M)it  0.08**  0.07*    0.06  0.06 
(GNE−M)it×Chinai        0.26  0.22 
popjt  1.60***  1.71***    1.57***  1.67*** 
popit  0.91*  1.04*    0.98*  1.10** 
Adjusted R
2    0.001  0.003    0.001  0.003 
Observations  62 545  62 545    62 545  62 545 
Notes:  Model estimated with robust standard errors. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 
1 per cent levels  respectively. Data cover bilateral trade between 180  economies  for the period 
1980–2008.  Resource imports are excluded from aggregate imports (M). For regressions with China 
dummy interactions, the China dummy was also included on its own (because country-pair fixed effects 




Appendix E: Data Used in Regressions 
Table E1: Additional Data Descriptions and Sources 
(continued next page) 
Variable  Description and source 
Value of bilateral 
non-oil resource 
imports 
The sum of annual bilateral imports of ‘metal ores’ (SITC code 28) 
and ‘coke and coal’ (SITC code 32) in US dollars. As both ‘metal 
ores’ and ‘coke and coal’ SITC codes are consistent across SITC 
revision 2 and SITC revision 3 classifications, the dataset comprises 
all bilateral import observations reported under either SITC revision 
over the period 1980–2008. 
Source: United Nations COMTRADE database 
Resource prices  Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices database 
Volume of non-oil 
resource imports 
The value of bilateral non-oil resource imports by country i  from 
country  j  in year t  divided by resource prices. Metal ore sub-
components are deflated by a comparable IMF commodity price index 
where one is available, with 2005 chosen as a base year. For metal 
ores that lack a corresponding price index (such as manganese), we 
deflate their nominal trade value by the IMF metal price index. Coke 
and coal imports are deflated by the IMF coal price index. The sub-
components  are then weighted together to create ‘real’ volumes of 
bilateral resource imports. 
Real GDP  Annual real GDP in 1990 prices. 
Source:  United Nations  National Accounts Main Aggregates 
Database, ‘GDP and its Breakdown at Constant 1990 Prices in US 
Dollars, All countries for all years – sorted alphabetically’ excel file. 
Available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnltransfer.asp?fID=6>. 
October 2009 vintage data accessed. 
The UN real GDP data are reported differently to the COMTRADE 
trade data for a few economies. Specifically, UN COMTRADE 
aggregates trade data for Belgium and Luxembourg into the one 
region over 1980–1998 (but record trade data for the two countries 
separately thereafter), whereas GDP data are recorded separately for 
the two countries in all years.  Similarly, trade data for Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland are aggregated into the 
South African Customs Union region over 1980–1999, but real GDP 
data are reported for each country individually. From 2000, both trade 
and GDP data are reported separately for each of the five countries. 
As Belgium is a sizeable importer and South Africa a major exporter 
of resources, in years where the trade data has been aggregated we 
also aggregate GDP across the two regions. We then identify the two 




Table E1: Additional Data Descriptions and Sources 
(continued) 
Variable  Description and source 
  While trade data are reported for the former USSR, former Yugoslavia 
and former Czechoslovakia as aggregated regions over 1980–1991, 
comparable real GDP data for these regions could not be obtained. 
Similarly, trade data are reported for East and West Germany 
separately in the years 1980–1990, but consistent real GDP data were 
not available. Thus, trade data for these economies have been omitted 
from the regressions. 
Population  Adjustments were made for Belgium and Luxembourg, and the South 
African Customs Union to ensure consistency with the real GDP data. 
Source: Angus Maddison’s ‘Statistics on World Population, GDP and 
Per Capita GDP, 1–2008  AD’. Data available at 
<http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/>. Site accessed December 2009. 
Real exports  Real exports in 1990 prices, with adjustments made for Belgium and 
Luxembourg, and the South African Customs Union  to ensure 
consistency with the real GDP data. 
Source: see Real GDP 
Real imports  Real imports in 1990 prices, with adjustments made for Belgium and 
Luxembourg, and the South African Customs Union  to ensure 
consistency with the real GDP data. 
Source: see Real GDP 
Real investment  Real investment in 1990 prices, with adjustments made for Belgium 
and  Luxembourg, and the South African Customs Union to ensure 
consistency with the real GDP data. 




Table E2: List of Countries
 (a) 




Republic  Ghana  Liberia 
Albania  Chad
(b)  Greece  Libya 
Algeria  Chile  Grenada  Lithuania 
Angola
(b)  China  Guatemala  Luxembourg
(c) 
Antigua and Barbuda  Colombia  Guinea  Macedonia 
Argentina  Comoros
(b)  Guinea-Bissau
(b)  Madagascar 
Armenia  Congo (Brazzaville)  Guyana  Malawi 
Australia  Costa Rica  Haiti
(b)  Malaysia 
Austria  Côte d’Ivoire  Honduras  Maldives 
Azerbaijan  Croatia  Hong Kong  Mali 
Bahamas, The  Cuba  Hungary  Malta 
Bahrain  Cyprus  Iceland  Mauritania 
Bangladesh  Czech Republic  India  Mauritius 
Barbados  Denmark  Indonesia  Mexico 
Belarus  Djibouti  Iran  Moldova 
Belgium
(c)  Dominica  Iraq
(b)  Mongolia 
Belgium and 
Luxembourg
(c)  Dominican Republic  Ireland  Montenegro
(b),(h) 
Belize  Ecuador  Israel  Morocco 
Benin  Egypt  Italy  Mozambique 
Bermuda  El Salvador  Jamaica  Namibia
(g) 
Bolivia  Equatorial Guinea
(b)  Japan  Nepal 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  Eritrea
(d)  Jordan  Netherlands 
Brazil  Estonia  Kazakhstan  New Zealand 
Brunei  Ethiopia
(d)  Kenya  Nicaragua 
Bulgaria  Fiji  Kiribati  Niger 
Burkina Faso  Finland  Kuwait  Nigeria 
Burundi  France  Kyrgyzstan  Norway 
Cambodia  Gabon  Laos
(b)  Oman 
Cameroon  Gambia, The  Latvia  Pakistan 
Canada  Georgia  Lebanon  Palau
(b),(i) 
Cape Verde  Germany
(e)  Lesotho




Table E2: List of Countries
 (a) 
(continued) 
Papua New Guinea 
Sao Tome and 
Principe  Spain  Turkey 
Paraguay  Saudi Arabia  Sri Lanka  Turkmenistan 
Peru  Senegal  Sudan  Uganda 
Philippines  Serbia
(h)  Swaziland
(g)  Ukraine 
Poland  Seychelles  Sweden  United Arab Emirates 
Portugal  Sierra Leone
(b)  Switzerland  United Kingdom 
Qatar  Singapore  Syria  United States 
Romania  Slovakia  Tajikistan
(b)  Uruguay 
Russia  Slovenia  Tanzania  Uzbekistan
(b) 
Rwanda  Solomon Islands  Thailand  Venezuela 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis
 (j)  Somalia
(b)  Togo  Vietnam 
Saint Lucia  South Africa
(g)  Tonga  Yemen
(e) 




(g)  Trinidad and Tobago  Zambia 
Samoa  South Korea  Tunisia  Zimbabwe 
Notes:  (a) Data span 1980–2008. While data were available for Bhutan, Botswana, Suriname, Timor-Leste, 
and Vanuatu, because residuals for these countries were particularly large they were treated as 
outliers and therefore excluded from the regressions. However, the results for all equations remain 
robust to their inclusion. 
  (b) Resource importer only. 
  (c) Data for ‘Belgium’ and ‘Luxembourg’ span 1999–2008, while ‘Belgium and Luxembourg’ span 
1980–1998. 
  (d) Data span 1993–2008. 
  (e) Data span 1991–2008. 
  (f) Resource exporter only. 
  (g) ‘South African Customs Union’ data span 1980–1999. Data for Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa 
and Swaziland span 2000–2008. 
  (h) Data span 2006–2008. 
  (i)  Data span 1992–2008. 
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